The Dynamic Present
Antony Galton
In P. Hasle, P. Blackburn and P. Øhrstrøm,
Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from Prior, Volume 1 (open access E-book), Aalborg University Press, 2017, p.167-187.
ISBN 978-87-7112-677-8
Abstract
The so called "at-at" theory of change and motion states that there
is nothing more to change than objects' possessing different
properties at different times, and nothing more to motion than their
being in different positions at different times. In this theory the
history of the world is reduced to a succession of individually static
world-states which take it in turns to be present. In most versions of
the theory, in order to accommodate continuity of change and motion,
it is assumed that the present times at which such static world-states
hold are instants. The picture of reality thus presented favours an
ontology in which the first-class entities are substances, or objects,
which act as the bearers of the static properties and positions whose
different values at different instants constitute the changes and
motions that those entities undergo. A persistent, if minority, strain
in the history of philosophy, however, has held that the first-class
inhabitants of the ontology should be processes rather than
objects. This idea raises problems for the traditional instant-based
model of time, since processes, being inherently temporally extended,
can only exist over intervals, not at instants. This paper
draws on the ideas of such philosophers as Whitehead, James, and
Bergson to explore the ramifications of the idea that the present
should be treated as an interval whose contents are inherently dynamic
in nature, the dynamic present of the title.
Antony Galton
Last modified: Thu Nov 16 09:32:12 GMT 2016